My disturbing memory of Beruit Lebanon in the summer of 1982 as a young Navy officer
I was in Beirut, Lebanon as a young LTJG USN with the 24 mau from August 1982 to March 1983 as part of the Multi-National Peace Keeping Force MNF.
Reagan viewed the MNF as a way to protect Palestinian civilians, reduce Syrian and Israeli influence, and promote Lebanese reconciliation..
FOCUS on this mission statement. PROTECT Palestinian civilians and of course innocent Lebanese to rebuild the horrific destruction of downtown Beirut. I can not even begin to describe the destruction done by the IDF.
We heard the word HEZBOLLAH several times and used the word to describe the Shia militia units that were involved in protecting themselves and Palestinians. I was never that worried about them in our ROE but seriously more bothered by the word IDF.
We remembered the USS Liberty incident very well and even though we were told several times it was a case of mistaken identity we knew differently down in our hearts.
https://www.thethirdheaventraveler.com/2025/03/the-essential-lesson-of-uss-liberty.html
So why do folks today say Hezbollah didn’t exist until 1987? Well technically it didn’t officially declare itself as such but we did know the name and used it extensively see and research this for yourself. I also discuss it further in this article.
I believe with all my heart and there is an actual record of a former Mosaad agent claiming that Mosaad knew of the Marine barracks bombing but failed to notify US military sources. I also believe that Mosaad was part of the entire thing and Iran and Hezbollah were blamed.
Just like this is called a conspiracy so is the USS Liberty and 911 both called conspiracy if ISRAEL is named as being involved directly.
The marines that relieved our marines were moved out of their bunkered position by the airport in Beirut and into barracks in Beirut. Who made the decision to do this and why? second question.
What was Mossad's fingerprint on this bombing supposedly done by Hezbollah ? 3rd. Why didn't Reagan the US president punish Hezbollah? This is exactly another false flag like the USS Liberty. Like 911 Find the facts
For the record I served as a young US Naval Officer onboard the USS Fort Snelling LSD 30
24th MAU / PHIBRON 6 / USS Fort Snelling on the first Lebanon cycle (August ’82 to March 1983.
A different 24th MAU rotation (same unit designation, different time and some different personnel) went back in May 1983 and is the one that was hit in the October 23, 1983 barracks bombing.
Shortly after arriving we were briefed on the situation of an extremely complex mixture of religions, ideologies and rumors of “genocide” of militias and the IDF killing and buring hundreds of innocent civilians from the city of Beruit in mass graves dug up by the IDF.
Background:
How Israel Used Its Proxy Militia
During the 1982 Lebanon War, the IDF invaded and then occupied West Beirut, surrounding the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.aljazeera+1
On 16 September 1982, the Israeli army sent about 150 fighters from the Lebanese Phalangist (“Lebanese Forces”) militia into the camps, supposedly to search for remaining PLO fighters.imeu+1
The Phalangists were a hard-right Christian militia long armed, trained, and funded by Israel, widely recognized as an Israeli proxy during the war.palquest+1
Herding, Killing, and Mass Graves
Once inside, the Phalangist militiamen carried out systematic killings:
Over about 36–48 hours, they murdered between roughly 2,000 and 3,500 people, mostly unarmed Palestinian refugees and some Lebanese civilians—women, children, and the elderly.aljazeera+2
Survivors, journalists, and later investigations describe militiamen rounding up civilians, shooting them in alleys and courtyards, and executing them at close range. Many victims were raped and mutilated.imeu+1
According to detailed reconstructions, the Phalange used bulldozers to bury bodies in mass graves, making it impossible to establish an exact death toll; many victims simply disappeared into these pits.imeu
The IDF’s Role: Control, Flares, and Bulldozers
The IDF probably was directly involved in physically pulling the triggers inside the camps, but multiple sources show direct operational enabling:
Israeli forces surrounded the camps, barred anyone from leaving, and controlled access points in and out of Sabra and Shatila.palquest+2
As killings went on, Israeli troops fired illumination flares over the camps at night, literally lighting the area so their proxy militia could continue killing after dark.palquest+1
When it became clear that civilians were being massacred, the Israeli command did not stop the Phalange. Instead, they allowed more Phalangist fighters to enter on the second day.imeu
The Israeli military also supplied bulldozers, which were used in part to dispose of bodies—contributing to the mass graves and the difficulty of ever fully counting the dead.imeu
An Israeli commission (the Kahan Commission) later found that the Phalangists bore direct responsibility for the massacre but that Israeli authorities, including Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, bore indirect responsibility for allowing a known brutal proxy force into the camps and failing to stop the killing once reports reached them.aljazeera
Druze Militias and Other Atrocities
The specific pattern —local militias herding civilians and committing mass killings—was not unique to the Phalange. Throughout the Lebanese civil war, Christian, Druze, and other militias committed sectarian massacres, often “cleansing” areas to create homogeneous cantons:
Historians describe a “logic of forming homogeneous cantons,” with massacres, roadblock executions based on sect identity, and forced expulsions carried out by various militias, including Druze forces under leaders like Kamal Jumblatt.sciencespo
In many cases, these militias acted with foreign backing (Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, etc.), and civilians were killed, displaced, or buried in mass graves as lines shifted and communities were purged.sciencespo
So, in clean terms
In 1982, Israel used a proxy militia (the Phalangist “Lebanese Forces”) to enter fenced-in, surrounded civilian camps that the IDF controlled from outside.aljazeera+2
The militia then massacred thousands of civilians and buried many of them in mass graves, while the IDF lit the sky with flares, blocked escape routes, allowed reinforcements in, and provided bulldozers.palquest+1
This is the best-documented case that matches what I'm describing: civilians trapped, slaughtered, and buried, with Israel’s proxy doing the direct killing and the IDF enabling and overseeing the operation.
- Shatila — a Palestinian refugee camp established in 1949 after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Nakba). It housed thousands of Palestinian refugees and their descendants.
- Sabra — a nearby poor neighborhood (not officially a camp) that was also home to many Palestinians and some Lebanese Shias.
- Israeli forces surrounded and controlled the area after entering West Beirut.
- Following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel (Maronite Christian president-elect and Israeli ally), Phalangist militias (Lebanese Forces / Kataeb — Maronite Christian right-wing group) entered the camps with Israeli approval and coordination.
- Over approximately 36–43 hours, the Phalangists killed between 1,300 and 3,500+ civilians — mostly Palestinian refugees, along with some Lebanese Shias. Many victims were women, children, and elderly. Reports include killings by shooting, stabbing, and other brutal methods; some bodies were mutilated.
- The IDF surrounded the camps, provided flares for illumination at night, and allowed the Phalangists in.
- Israeli commanders received reports of killings but did not stop them quickly enough.
- The commission found indirect responsibility for Israel and held Ariel Sharon (then Defense Minister) personally accountable for failing to prevent the foreseeable massacre.
Meanwhile:
While on watch:
The rules of engagement briefings were a nightmare. I sat there before each mission trying to sort out every faction in Beirut that got its own carve‑out, its own caveat, its own political exception.
I was supposed to “keep the peace” in a city that didn’t have any, while the real combatants—IDF, Druze, Amal, emerging Hezbollah, Phalangists, Syrians—kept doing exactly what they’d been doing for years. On paper, I had a mission. In reality, I had a target painted on me and a long list of people I was not allowed to shoot at.
They told me who was in my lane and who was not. The Lebanese Army was “friendly.” The Christian militias were “allies.” The Druze were “hostile but not our fight.” The IDF was “operating independently” and “not in our ROE.” I was reminded over and over that I was not there to fight Israel, not there to fight Syria, not there to fight half the guys shooting at each other in the hills and the city. I was there to stand in between and absorb the blasts if anyone decided I looked soft enough.
That’s what “peacekeeper” meant to me in Beirut in 1982: standing in the middle of kill zones owned by other people. Every ROE brief made it clearer. I could return fire, but only if I could identify who fired at me, which side of some invisible line they were on, what weapon they used, whether my response would upset the political balance of the day. By the time the lawyers and the politics were done, I was left with a personal .45 side arm, a flak jacket, a helmet and a sick feeling that the only ones truly constrained were the Americans—and I was one of them.
I knew the factions: Druze mortars in the hills, Christian checkpoints, Amal and other Shia groups in the suburbs, early Hezbollah cells starting to surface, PLO remnants still in the mix, IDF armor and artillery beyond the perimeter. And in the middle of that tornado, they parked us in the Amphibious Objective Area and our U.S. Marines—at the airport.
The UN had already been there, and my view, shared by a lot of us, was simple: they were a joke. Blue helmets with no teeth. Everybody in Beirut knew it and acted accordingly. That was the story I heard before I ever dropped anchor: “UN peacekeepers” was a phrase people used with a smirk. They talked, they observed, they wrote reports, and the killing went on.
The Europeans in the Multinational Force were better, but even there the burden wasn’t equal. The French and Italians had sectors downtown, closer to the city itself, more mixed, more urban. The British presence was smaller and I didn’t see them much day‑to‑day. We, the U.S. Marines, drew the worst hand: Beirut International Airport—flat, exposed, a symbolic target everybody could find on a map, surrounded by factions that hated each other and weren’t too fond of us either.
The airport wasn’t just bad ground tactically; it was bad ground politically. Everyone flew through it or shelled around it, and everybody watched it. From my perspective as a boat security officer and part of the amphibious force, I could look from sea to shore and see the insanity of it: a battalion of Marines sitting in a fixed position at an international airport in a civil war, with artillery in the hills, jets overhead, and militias in every direction.
So when I say the ROE briefings were a nightmare and that I felt like I was in the middle of all sides because others had failed—UN first, then the politicians—that’s the core of that deployment for me. On paper, it was peacekeeping. In the briefs, it was restriction after restriction. On the ground, it was sitting in a box, waiting for someone to decide I was the message they wanted to send.
We would hear the word HEZBOLLAH several times and even in ROE briefs but they were never labeled as threat as much as a the fear we felt of being collateral damage of the fighting factions and the IDF SHELLING AND BOMBING even after there was a supposed CEASE FIRE.
Evidence of Shelling of the Beirut Area After U.S. Arrival
There are two points to separate:
The main Israeli siege and bombardment of Beirut (June–August 1982) happened just before the first MNF landed.
Explosive hazards and intermittent fire into the Beirut area continued after Marines were on the ground.
Heavy IDF bombardment during the siege
During the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli action around Beirut involved continuous artillery shelling and airstrikes as the IDF besieged West Beirut.wikipedia+2
Scholarly and contemporary accounts describe “continuous artillery shelling” of West Beirut as one of the two main forms of Israeli action during the offensive, along with air attacks.jstor
This heavy fire is documented mainly for June–August 1982, leading up to and overlapping with the first MNF deployment in late August (the PLO evacuation period).merip+2
After Marines were on the ground
Directly on your question—IDF-related explosive fire affecting Marines after they were in Beirut:
UPI reported on 30 September 1982 that “An artillery shell left from the Israeli siege of Beirut exploded near a group of U.S. Marines clearing minefields Thursday”, wounding no one but clearly illustrating that unexploded Israeli shells from the siege remained and were a live danger after the MNF arrival.upi
That line matters: it is explicit that Marines were operating in an environment still full of IDF-fired ordnance even after Israel’s formal pullback from central Beirut.
A detailed MNF timeline notes that after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the Sabra/Shatila massacre in September, an Israeli push into Muslim West Beirut triggered renewed fighting and shelling around the city as the 32d MAU prepared to redeploy ashore.multinationalforcebeirut+1
The same timeline records that on 29 November 1982 “Two Marines and one sailor are wounded in action by shell fragments during the shelling of Beirut International Airport (BIA), part of a general pattern of shelling around the airport area.”multinationalforcebeirut
That November 1982 shelling is generally attributed to local factions (Druze, Shi’a, or others), not explicitly IDF, but it shows that artillery and indirect fire continued into the Beirut area while U.S. forces were present.
There is extensive documentation of heavy IDF artillery and air bombardment of Beirut before and overlapping with the initial MNF landing; there is specific evidence of Marines being endangered by leftover Israeli artillery shells and of ongoing shelling of the airport zone while they were deployed, though not every later shell can be tied to the IDF.
After August 1982, I was in a battlespace where:
Israeli artillery had recently pounded West Beirut during the siege and left unexploded shells that were still going off near Marines even after the initial cease-fires.merip+2
Israeli jets (F‑15s, F‑16s, and other IAF aircraft) had been bombing Beirut and other targets in Lebanon as part of the invasion and siege campaign.
Again, I have to ask the question. Why were we continually told there is no ROE or concern about the IDF but yet we knew there was.
Let me stop here and say, USS LIBERTY before I continue:
USS LIBERTY incident.
https://www.thethirdheaventraveler.com/2025/03/the-essential-lesson-of-uss-liberty.html
The official US and Israel records list the USS Liberty as a mistake by the IDF. A case of mistaken identity. IF YOU BELIEVE THIS THEN YOU’RE GOING TO BELIEVE THAT THE IDF HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MARINE BARRACKS BOMBING.
1. Decision to Move the US Marines and Reasons Behind It Based on historical records, there appears to be a slight discrepancy in the description of the locations. The US Marine barracks that was bombed on October 23, 1983, was actually located at the Beirut International Airport (BIA), south of central Beirut—not in downtown Beirut itself. The four-story Battalion Landing Team (BLT) headquarters building housed the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, and was situated southeast of a key intersection at the airport grounds. The French paratroopers were based in a separate building in western Beirut (closer to what might be considered "downtown" areas), which was also bombed that day. The US Marines had been primarily based at or near the airport since their initial deployment in August 1982, with rotations of Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) like the 32nd, 24th, and 22nd MAUs cycling through.No Major "Move" from Bunkers to Barracks Documented: There isn't clear evidence of a specific decision to relocate Marines from a "bunkered position by the airport" to a downtown barracks. Instead, the Marines were deployed directly to positions at BIA as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) peacekeeping mission.
Initially, upon arrival in August 1982, they established positions at the airport to oversee the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters from Beirut following Israel's invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee). Over time, as the security situation deteriorated with increased mortar, rocket, and sniper attacks from Druze militias, Palestinian guerrillas, and other factions, some units may have shifted within the airport area for tactical reasons.
The official story is as follows:
By mid-1983, the BLT headquarters was in the vulnerable concrete building at BIA, which lacked heavy bunkering—criticized later for inadequate defenses like concertina wire and sentry posts without loaded weapons under strict rules of engagement (ROE) emphasizing neutrality and minimal force.”
This is a lie.
The US Marines were living in sand bag dug outs on the entrance to the airport. I would visit them from time to time to resupply them from the ship as I was assigned as the boat officer.
The conditions were horrible. It smelled and they were not able to bathe or eat warm food. But at least they were safe.
One day in particular I heard this snapping overhead like the high sound of a whip cracking.
I Marine Gunny Sgt what that was and was informed it was a sniper taking pot shots at us.
I said, “What… are you serious?” He casually nodded and said something like, “Serious as a heart attack.” I said, “Damn, you can’t pay me enough to stand out here and get shot at.” As I nervously walked around figured I’d be a harder target to hit if I were walking, the Marine Gunny calmly said, nah, no worries, he’s a bad shot and out of range and if he really did hit you, you wouldn’t feel a thing and just go sleepy bye.”
I said, “Ok, I’m outta here, let’s finish offloading your supplies.”
He said, “Ah come on LT you aint gonna stick around and have a cup of coffee with us?”
I said, “No, sorry Gunny,” I ain’t a Marine. Take care of your self. You guys ain’t right in the head.”
We both laughed and I then spoke about the incident with other officers noteably senior USMC officers who said living in those sandbags dug outs keep Marines alive.
There was continual talk of moving the Marines out of the sandbag dug out into a barack with showers and clean sheets to sleep in. But our MAU resisted that.
Who Made the Decision: The overall deployment and positioning of US forces in Lebanon were authorized by President Ronald Reagan, who overrode objections from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Reagan agreed to contribute Marines to the MNF in July 1982, influenced by Secretary of State Alexander Haig's strategy. Specific tactical positioning at BIA (including the choice of the headquarters building) fell to military commanders on the ground, such as Col. Timothy J. Geraghty (commander of the 24th MAU) and higher US military leadership in the chain of command, under guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Redeployments occurred after events like the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September 1982, with Reagan signing National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 64 on October 28, 1982, to expand the MNF's role. Post-massacre, the Marines were redeployed to Beirut (still primarily at BIA) to support the Lebanese government under President Amin Gemayel.
Why the Positioning/Deployment: The primary goal was peacekeeping during the Lebanese Civil War: to facilitate the PLO's evacuation, stabilize Beirut after the Israeli invasion, prevent escalation into a broader Arab-Israeli or Syrian-involved war, and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in rebuilding control. Reagan viewed the MNF as a way to protect Palestinian civilians, reduce Syrian and Israeli influence, and promote Lebanese reconciliation.
Positioning at the airport provided strategic access for logistics, air support, and proximity to LAF positions, but it exposed forces to attacks from surrounding hills controlled by hostile militias. Critics later noted the site was chosen for its visibility as a "presence" mission rather than defensibility, and ROE limited aggressive defenses to maintain perceived neutrality. After the bombing, surviving Marines were relocated to underground bunkers at the airport using Soviet-bloc CONEX containers and eventually offshore to ships for protection against ongoing threats.
2. Mossad's Alleged "Fingerprint" on the Bombing Attributed to Hezbollah
All official records blame Iran and Hezbollah.
The 1983 Beirut barracks bombing is overwhelmingly attributed by mainstream historical and intelligence sources to Hezbollah (then emerging as a Shiite militant group), acting as a proxy for Iran and Syria under the front name "Islamic Jihad." The attack involved two suicide truck bombs loaded with PETN explosives (supplied by Iran), killing 241 US service members, 58 French troops, 6 civilians, and the 2 attackers.
So called evidence includes intercepted Iranian diplomatic messages from September 26, 1983, directing "spectacular action against the American Marines," testimony from Hezbollah operatives, and US court rulings (e.g., a 2003 federal case finding Iran liable for providing financial and logistical support via its Ministry of Information and Security and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).
Hezbollah founders like Imad Mughniyeh and Mustafa Badreddine are named as key planners, with meetings at the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Iran and Syria have denied involvement, as has Hezbollah officially, though it has praised the attackers.
Mossad not only knew about the plans, they were involved just like they were in the USS Liberty and of course 911.
Mossad's Alleged Role: Official records claim: There is no substantiated evidence of direct Mossad (Israeli intelligence) involvement in planning or executing the bombing.
HOWEVER, let’s look at this smoking gun evidence of their involvement:
However, a controversial claim of foreknowledge comes from Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad agent, in his 1990 book By Way of Deception. Ostrovsky alleges Mossad knew the specific time and location of the attack but only shared vague, general warnings with the US, deeming detailed info not in Israel's interest (as decided by Mossad head Nahum Admoni). This purportedly allowed the bombing to proceed, potentially to push the US out of Lebanon and reduce competition with Israeli influence. Admoni denied any prior knowledge, and historian Benny Morris has questioned Ostrovsky's credibility, calling the claim "odd" and possibly fabricated due to his junior status and Mossad's compartmentalization.
These allegations surfaced in media like a 1990 Los Angeles Times article but remain unverified and are often dismissed as unreliable or motivated by Ostrovsky's fallout with Mossad. No official US investigations (e.g., the 1983 DoD Commission or FBI forensics) implicate Mossad, and declassified intelligence points squarely to Iranian orchestration.
3. Why Didn't President Reagan Punish Hezbollah?
Reagan publicly condemned the bombing and vowed justice for the perpetrators, whom his administration identified as Shiite militants (now known as Hezbollah elements) linked to Iran and Syria. On October 28, 1983, he signed NSDD 111 for a tougher policy, including broader rules of engagement, naval/air support for the LAF, and cooperation with Israel against Syria. US forces conducted some indirect actions, like naval bombardments of militant positions in December 1983, but no direct strikes on Hezbollah or Iran occurred.
Plans for joint US-French air strikes on Hezbollah's Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek were approved by Reagan but canceled by Weinberger due to concerns over evidence and risks.
Reasons for No Direct Punishment:Internal Disagreements: Reagan's advisors were divided—Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane pushed for action, but Weinberger opposed small-scale operations, fearing escalation without clear benefits. He prioritized broader Cold War military buildup over terrorism responses.
Cold War Strategic Priorities: Iran was seen as a vital buffer ("cork in the bottle") against Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. Retaliation risked destabilizing Iran, inviting Soviet intervention via proxies, disrupting oil flows, or alienating moderate Arab allies (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain) already facing Iranian-backed Shia unrest. The administration hoped for future US-Iran rapprochement post-Khomeini and viewed Iran's anti-Soviet stance as inadvertently helpful.
Lack of Diplomatic Progress and Risks: Syrian intransigence blocked Lebanese reconciliation, and strikes could escalate the civil war or the Iran-Iraq War (where the US tilted toward Iraq). Evidence, while strong (e.g., intercepts linking Iran), was debated for justifying attacks without blowback.
Congressional and Public Pressure: Mounting opposition in Congress (e.g., War Powers Act constraints limiting deployment to 18 months) and criticism from the DoD's Long Commission report on the Marines' vulnerability led to withdrawal instead of escalation. By February 1984, Reagan ordered Marines offshore, ending the MNF mission amid leaks and political fallout.
Overall Restraint: Despite rhetoric of "swift and effective retribution," the bombing led to withdrawal rather than invasion, as in Grenada days later (October 25, 1983). This reflected a pattern where terrorism responses were subordinated to containing Soviet influence.
Regarding the False Flag Claim (Similar to USS Liberty)The USS Liberty incident (1967) involved an Israeli attack on a US ship during the Six-Day War, officially deemed a mistake but alleged by some as intentional to draw the US into the conflict. For the 1983 Beirut bombing, no credible evidence supports it being a false flag operation orchestrated by Israel, Mossad, or the US. Extensive investigations (e.g., DoD Commission, FBI, US courts) attribute it to Iranian-backed Hezbollah as retaliation for US support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and perceived bias toward Israel/Lebanese Christians. Conspiracy theories occasionally surface online, echoing Ostrovsky's foreknowledge claims or suggesting Israeli benefits from US withdrawal (which allowed Israel more freedom in Lebanon), but these lack substantiation and are contradicted by declassified intelligence showing Iranian orders and Hezbollah execution. Mainstream sources treat it as a terrorist attack by Iranian proxies, not a staged event.
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